This chapter describes the concept Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in detail. We define CSR as the moral responsibility that companies have that goes beyond the bare minimum (abiding by minimal market morality), but that is nevertheless morally required. Because CSR is required, and not optional, it is different from philanthropy. The first part of this chapter presents the position of the proponents of CSR but also a view that denies that corporations are morally required to do more than the bare (...) minimum: the Friedman-Homann doctrine. The chapter describes the debate between these two positions. In the second part, we discuss four operationalized approaches that companies can use to make moral choices in practice: the shareholder approach, the stakeholder approach, the corporate citizen approach, and the market failures approach. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the question to what extent market participants can have moral responsibilities. It starts with a discussion on the nature of responsibility, and then raises the question whether organizations, such as companies can bear responsibility (at all). While some philosophers have been skeptical, we list some reasons to think that companies can be moral agents. Subsequently, we discuss whether companies actually should assume moral responsibilities. There are a number of commonly heard arguments about why companies should or (...) may not be bothered with moral responsibilities: i. the market is an amoral sphere, and ii. the only responsibility that companies have is to increase their profits. We describe the problems with these arguments, and discuss the concept of minimal market morality. This concept describes the minimally required moral responsibilities that companies need to abide by. (shrink)

This textbook not only provides the student with a solid foundation in ethics, but introduces students to the most important themes relevant to business today. Issues such as human rights violation down in the supply chain, the effect business has on nature and the environment, and inclusiveness are each discussed in separate chapters, which discuss their importance, but also their challenges. While there are numerous business ethics textbooks, few take a philosophical approach to business ethics. However, without introducing philosophical ethics, (...) discussions about business ethics are bound to get stuck in fallacies and paradoxes. This textbook therefore fills an important societal gap by providing an introduction to profound philosophical issues in clear language at a philosophically high, but accessible level. (shrink)

The Access principle places an epistemic restriction on our obligations. This principle falls prey to the ‘Shirker Problem’, namely that shirkers could evade their obligations by evading certain epistemic circumstances. To block this problem, it has been suggested that shirkers have the obligation to learn their obligations. This solution yields a regress, yet it is controversial what the moral of the regress actually is. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I spell out this intricate dispute. Second, on the (...) basis of my analyses I propose solutions to the Shirker Problem. (shrink)

Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).

Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.

According to Vallicella's 'Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley's Regress' (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella's conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three feature-pairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relata-specificity/relata-unspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be (...) relata-specific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition. (shrink)

Infinite regress arguments play an important role in many distinct philosophical debates. Yet, exactly how they are to be used to demonstrate anything is a matter of serious controversy. In this paper I take up this metaphilosophical debate, and demonstrate how infinite regress arguments can be used for two different purposes: either they can refute a universally quantified proposition (as the Paradox Theory says), or they can demonstrate that a solution never solves a given problem (as the Failure Theory says). (...) In the meantime, I show that Black’s view on infinite regress arguments (1996, this journal) is incomplete, and how his criticism of Passmore can be countered. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work is used to evaluate the quality of work. Typical cases of meaningless work that have been used to clarify this concept are assembly line work, and work involving other types of mindless tasks, but also David Graeber's ‘bullshit jobs’. I argue that there are at least two fundamental reasons to care about meaningful work: reasons from the wellbeing of the worker and reasons pertaining to meaningfulness of the worker's life. I first argue that a concept (...) of meaningful work needs to reflect these two values, but that these two values may come apart. Because of this, accounts that provide a single answer to the question to what extent a particular work context is meaningful work for a particular worker are unable to reflect these two values. I then survey three promising accounts of meaningful work: perfectionism, which captures the self-interested aspect of meaningful work well but fails to capture the meaningfulness aspect appropriately; consequentialism, which captures the meaningfulness aspect well but fails to capture the self-interested aspect; and Wolf's Fitting Fulfilment View of meaningful projects, which can be read as addressing both concerns but leads to implausible judgments about meaningful work. I then argue that we should conceive of the concerns that fall under the notion of meaningful work as two separate concepts and values. The best work incorporates both these dimensions but falling short on either dimension is problematic for different reasons. (shrink)

Clinical ethics support services are experiencing a phase of flourishing and of growing recognition. At the same time, however, the expectations regarding the acceptance and the integration of traditional CES services into clinical processes are not met. Ethics rounds as an additional instrument or as an alternative to traditional clinical ethics support strategies might have the potential to address both deficits. By implementing ethics rounds, we were able to better address the needs of the clinical sections and to develop a (...) more comprehensive account of ethics quality in our hospital, which covers the level of decisions and actions, and also the level of systems and processes and aspects of ethical leadership. (shrink)

The EPR problem is studied both from an instrumentalistic and from a realistic point of view. Bohr's reply to the EPR paper is analyzed and demonstrated to be not completely representative of Bohr's general views on the possibility of defining properties of a microscopic object. A more faithful Bohrian answer would not have led Einstein to the conclusion that Bohr's completeness claim of quantum mechanics implies nonlocality. The projection postulate, already denounced in 1936 by Margenau as the source of the (...) EPR paradox, is found to be also at the origin of the nonlocality conundrum. Its unobservability in EPR-like experiments is demonstrated, thus showing the redundancy of the idea of nonlocality in the instrumentalist interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is argued that also from a realist point of view there is no reason to assume nonlocality. The relevance of Bohm's quantum potential and of Bell's inequalities with respect to the (non)locality problem is discussed. (shrink)

The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is: is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that have been investigated for scientific explanations. Three (...) main asymmetry criteria have been proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unification, and (iii) explanatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion (in modified format) holds of them. (shrink)

Dietzgen's philosophy is monistic in nature. This study is focused on the question in what way Dietzgen treats the relation between unity and diversity as an epistemological and ontological issue. How does Dietzgen formulate the unity of all that exists, and what is the place and the role of the process of gaining knowledge in this formulation? These questions serve as stepping stones to the central question: What is the position of Dieagen's thinking with regard to the philosophy of Feuerbach, (...) and that of Marx and Engels? This is an important question in the light of the history of the labour movement. In the early years of this century, Dietzgen's work became a subject of discussion. Some said that Dietzgen had nothing to add to Feuerbach's philosophy; others regarded him as the perfect Marxist philosopher. This discussion has not ended. The present study seeks to clarify the positions in this discussion by means of an analysis of Dietzgen's philosophy itself. This raises the additional questions of it's relation to Kant's epistemological theory, to scientific and Darwinist-oriented materialism, and to Dietzgen's ethical ideas and criticism of religion. (shrink)

The problem of simultaneous measurement of incompatible observables in quantum mechanics is studied on the one hand from the viewpoint of an axiomatic treatment of quantum mechanics and on the other hand starting from a theory of measurement. It is argued that it is precisely such a theory of measurement that should provide a meaning to the axiomatically introduced concepts, especially to the concept of observable. Defining an observable as a class of measurement procedures yielding a certain prescribed result for (...) the probability distribution of the set of values of some quantity (to be described by the set of eigenvalues of some Hermitian operator), this notion is extended to joint probability distributions of incompatible observables. It is shown that such an extension is possible on the basis of a theory of measurement, under the proviso that in simultaneously measuring such observables there is a disturbance of the measurement results of the one observable, caused by the presence of the measuring instrument of the other observable. This has as a consequence that the joint probability distribution cannot obey the marginal distribution laws usually imposed. This result is of great importance in exposing quantum mechanics as an axiomatized theory, since overlooking it seems to prohibit an axiomatic description of simultaneous measurement of incompatible observables by quantum mechanics. (shrink)

It is common to consider an area of science as a system of real or sup posed truths which not only continuously extends itself, but also needs periodical revision and therefore tests the inventive capacity of each generation of scholars anew. It sounds highly implausible that a science at one time would be completed, that at that point within its scope there would be no problems left to solve. Indeed, the solution of a scientific problem inevitably raises new questions, so (...) that our eagerness for knowledge will never find lasting satisfaction. Nevertheless there is one science which seems to form an exception to this rule, formal logic, the theory of rigorous argumentation. It seems to have reached the ideal endpoint of every scientific aspiration already very shortly after its inception; using the work of some predecessors, Aristotle, or so it is at least assumed by many, has brought this branch of science once and for all to a conclusion. Of course this doesn't sound that implausible. We apparently know what rigorous argumentation is; otherwise various sciences, in particular pure mathematics, would be completely impossible. And if we know what rigorous argumentation is, then it cannot be difficult to trace once and for all the rules which govern it. The unique subject of formal logic would therefore entail that this science, in variance with the rule which holds for all other sciences, has been able to reach completion at a certain point in history. (shrink)

Philosophers deny a proposal for actions can be deduced from arguments for or against the proposal because they may be incompatible. Nevertheless, people in general, and politicians especially, make decisions and present arguments they believe are convincing. We studied politicians who made decisions in complex situations. They spoke about possible actions, their consequences, the probabilities of these consequences and their evaluations, but rarely indicated why their arguments led to their choice. We hypothesized implicit argumentation rules involved and checked whether they (...) predicted those choices. We found seven implicit informal logic rules involved. We also found a random sample of people made the same choices based on the same arguments, suggesting basic warrants by which people argue about decisions. (shrink)

Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they have in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in order to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow that one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it against challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its (...) most interesting format. In this paper I zoom in on this debate, and fix further details of Lammenranta’s lead. Specifically, I will side with skepticism that justification is dialectical, yet only if certain conditions are in place. (shrink)

A partial ordering in the class of observables (∼ positive operator-valued measures, introduced by Davies and by Ludwig) is explored. The ordering is interpreted as a form of nonideality, and it allows one to compare ideal and nonideal versions of the same observable. Optimality is defined as maximality in the sense of the ordering. The framework gives a generalization of the usual (implicit) definition of self-adjoint operators as optimal observables (von Neumann), but it can, in contrast to this latter definition, (...) be justified operationally. The nonideality notion is compared to other quantum estimation theoretic methods. Measures for the amount of nonideality are derived from information theory. (shrink)

International reports on environmental policy promote ‘education for sustainable development’ as an instrument for realising environmental awareness, values and attitudes consistent with the liberal concept of ‘sustainable development’. In this paper the ethical and political-philosophical assumptions of (education for) sustainable development will be criticised. First, it will be argued that (Rawlsian) liberal ethics cannot include obligations towards future generations. Second, the commentary focuses on the economic perspective underlying this liberal framework, its anthropocentric bias and the hierarchical distinction between public and (...) private spheres. Third, to offer a more adequate framework for environmental education, some fruitful ideas within neo-republicanism will be examined. (shrink)

Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as ‘if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p’? Glüer & Wikforss (2009a) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant (...) premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a ‘dilemma of regress and idleness’, as Glüer & Wikforss have dubbed it. (shrink)

In this paper I fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of its first premise.

This paper examines the increasingly popular view that new insights from the science of subjective well-being (SSWB) should play a prominent role in the determination of public policy. Though there are instrumental reasons for caring about societal happiness too, these political aspirations of the SSWB appear to be mostly intrinsically motivated. As the intrinsic value of happiness is endorsed across the political happiness as a fitting response to the state of the world, authenticity, and merit – it is shown that (...) different views of the conditionality of the intrinsic value of happiness have widely diverging policy implications, which greatly undermines the political aspirations of the SSWB. (shrink)

Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out (...) that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following, I take up this systematic query and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus? ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to ensure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life. (shrink)

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take (...) on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation. (shrink)

Han Bertens' The Idea of the Postmodern is the first introductory overview of postmodernism to succeed in providing a witty and accessibile guide to the sometimes befuddling subject. In clear, straight forward, and always elegant prose, Bertens sets out the interdisciplinary aspects, the critical debates, the historical development and the key theorists of postmodernism. He also explains, in thoughtful and illuminating language, the relationship between postmodernism and poststructuralism, lucidly distinguishing modernism from postmodernism through an examination of the fields of architecture, (...) visual arts, and photography. Emphasizing the importance played by heterogeneity and difference in postmodern culture, Bertens carefully and adroitly defines the characteristics of postmodernism at every turn of the page. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown that the most rational of all creatures, Homo Oeconomicus, can be enticed to freely engage in an activity that is guaranteed to lead to his ruin. It is furthermore shown that this is possible if and only if utility functions are unbounded. The paper thus develops an argument in favour of bounded utility functions.

Does willful ignorance mitigate blameworthiness? In many legal systems, willfully ignorant wrongdoers are considered as blameworthy as knowing wrongdoers. This is called the ‘equal culpability thesis’. Given that legal practice depends on it, the issue has obvious importance. Interestingly enough, however, there exists hardly any philosophical reflection on ECT. A recent exception is Alexander Sarch, who defends a restricted version of ECT. On Sarch’s view, ECT is true whenever willfully ignorant agents incur additional blameworthiness for their ignorance. In this paper, (...) I defend an alternative view, according to which ECT is true whenever the motives of willfully ignorant and knowing wrongdoers are equally bad. (shrink)

This paper analyses the republican notion of non-domination from the viewpoint of individual dignity. It determines the aspect of individual dignity that republicans are concerned with and scrutinises how it is safeguarded by non-domination. I argue that the notion of non-domination as it is formulated by Pettit contains a number of ambiguities that need to be addressed. I discuss these ambiguities and argue for specific solutions that place great importance on a person’s moral beliefs and his status as a moral (...) being amongst others. Furthermore, I argue that the impunity interpretation is to be favoured over the immunity interpretation of non-domination. I show that whilst these solutions accord well with many important republican tenets, they have other implications that contradict known republican positions. In particular, I show there is both room and a need for retributivism within republicanism. (shrink)

Until late in the nineteenth century, madder was the most popular natural red dye. Holland was the largest and best-known supplier. As early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the province of Zeeland and adjoining parts of the provinces of South Holland and Brabant developed into important producers. In the course of the seventeenth century these areas even succeeded in acquiring a monopoly position. Early in the nineteenth century, however, this position came under attack because France had gone over to (...) industrial production methods from around 1800, whereas Holland continued to produce with craft technologies. After 1820, as a result, a period of stagnation and decay set in. The fate of the Dutch madder industry would have been completely sealed if the production capacity of the French factories had been sufficiently large to satisfy the great increase in demand. Consequently, in Holland, after 1845, a process of revival based upon the French manufacturing methods began slowly and hesitatingly. This process started too late and was not persevered with sufficiently to regain lost markets. The Dutch producers remained strongly attached to their own out-dated, craft methods of production. (shrink)

Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.

This comparative content analysis of Belgian and Swedish newspaper coverage of the ‘refugee situation’ in 2015 (N=898) revolves around responsibility indicators, news actor characteristics, and thematic emphasis. As they are a potential influential factor in the public-opinion formation process, the studying of media portrayals is an essential first step in investigating the dynamic interplay between media discourse and societal reactions. Belgium and Sweden differ with respect to migration policy, integration indicators, and the number of incoming refugees. They also differ in (...) terms of journalistic cultural values. As a result, they make for an excellent case study of intercultural differences and similarities in how refugees are reported on. Our analysis made clear that Belgian news coverage shows regional diversity, with Francophone Belgian journalists showing more tolerance towards migrants and thus tending to be more in line with their Swedish counterparts. Still, refugees are seldom allowed to speak for themselves. This warrants attention and action by news professionals. (shrink)

Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, Hume and Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers' practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.